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RmHTs OF FINDERS-Because the deeply important jurisprudential
concept of possession is involved, cases dealing with the problem of
finders assume an importance far beyond their practical significance.
The recent decision by the Oregon Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Steinburg1 suggests further discussion of the problem, with particular
reference to the cases in that state.
More than twenty-five years ago the writer of this comment published an article2 in which it was suggested that the rights of a finder
are in truth the rights of a possessor, the chief problem being the
determination of the vexing question, found in many situations other
than that of finding, as to who is the possessor of a thing. To become
a "finder" one must be more than a discoverer; one must take possession. 3 If F is a finder by having acquired possession of a "lost''4 article,
he is entitled to protection of his possession against anyone not able
to show a better right to that article. Owners and prior possessors
typify those able to show a better right. 5
Students of possession, of course, have noticed that courts are
inB.uenced in determining possession vel non by the results that will
How from such determination. 6 For example, a court may be more
inclined to attribute possession of a thing to a land occupant as against
a trespasser than as against one not wrongfully on the land.
·
A not uncommon notion is that a finder by the very act of findingrestoring the subject matter to the mass of usable things-has rendered
meritorious service entitling him to sympathetic consideration. To the
extent to which courts yield to this notion results may be reached
difficult to understand and reconcile with generally accepted views
as to possession and the rights of possessors. In a recent comment in this
1200 P. (2d) 376 (1948), rehearing, 205 P. (2d) 562 (1949).
2 Aigler, ''Rights of Finders," 21 Mica. L. REv. 664 (1923).
3 Such cases as Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 79 Am. Dec. 88 (1861) and Keron v.
Cashman, 33 A. 1055 (1896) are examples of this.
4 As the word ''lost" is used in this connection, it should make no difference whether
the thing in question was parted with inadvertently or was intentionally placed where "found."
5 The possible rights of officers, etc. need not be mentioned here.
6 See the illuminating discussion by Shartel, "Meanings of Possession," in 16 MmN.
L. Rev. 611 (1932). In this respect it is interesting to note such cases as State v. Munson,
111 Kan. 318, 206 P. 749 (1922), where it was held that one who held in his hands a container for the purpose of taking a drink therefrom did not have possession of the intoxicating
liquor in the container. The court observed that if such facts constituted possession, it would
mean that almost always the taking of a drink in Kansas would be a criminal act. H that had
been the legislative intent, presumably the legislature would have said so in more direct terms.

1950]

COMMENTS

353

Review,7 supplementing the discussion in the article mentioned above,8
it was said: "The obviously confused state of the decisions dealing with
the problem ... [ the rights of finders as against the occupant of the
place where the thing is found] is due in large part to the varying
weights given by the courts to the strict logic of the principles of possession, on the one side, and the more or less instinctive, emotional
appeal presented by the finder's part in the transaction, on the other."9
Such elements in the problem multiply the difficulties of anyone
attempting to formulate a statement of the law, also of the lawyer in
making up his mind how to advise a client. In this respect it is peculiarly interesting to review the decisions of one court.
Thousands of students in Personal Property, to say nothing of
numerous professors, have been puzzled by the decisions of the Oregon
court in Danielson v. Roherts1° and Ferguson v. Ray,11 particularly
when noticing that the two cases were decided only a few months
apart and are reported in the same volume. In the former case, in
which boys were hired by a farmer to clean out his henhouse and in
so doing dug up a can containing gold coins, it was concluded that
the farmer could not establish a better right to the money than the
boys who had delivered it to him. The court declared: "The fact
that the money was found on the premises of the defendants [ the
farmer], or that the plaintiffs were in their service at the time, can
in no way affect the plaintiffs' right to possession, or their duty in
reference to the lost treasure."12 Since the farmer made no claim as
owner of the gold, his only grounds for a claim of better right than that
of the boys were (I) prior possession of the gold as it lay there in his
henhouse, and (2) employer of the boys. Both contentions, assuming
they were made, were rejected in the sentence just quoted.
In the Ferguson case, some valuable gold quartz, buried in a sack
at the foot of a tree for a long time, was "found" by a tenant of the
land. The court concluded that the lessor had a better right to the
7 46 M:rcH. L Rllv. 235 (1947). That comment was prompted by two recent decisions:
Hannah v. Peel, [1945] K.B. 509, and Flax v. Monticello, 185 Va. 474, 39 S.E. (2d) 308
(1946). See also 46 M:rCH. L Rllv. 266 (1947) noting Erickson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 232,
26 N.W. (2d) 172 (1947).
8 Note 2, supra.
9 46 M:rcH. L. Rllv. 235 at 240·24 l (1947).
10 44 Ore. 108, 74 P. 913, 65 LR.A. 526, 102 Am. St. Rep. 627 (1904).
1144 Ore. 557, 77 P. 600, I LR.A. (n.s.) 477, 102 Am. St. Rep. 648 (1904).
12 Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Ore. 108 at ll5, 74 P. 913 (1904).
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quartz than the finder-tenant. Evidently, the quartz was deemed to
have been buried by some unknown person before the leasing of the
premises to the finder. A ruling by the trial court in favor of the finder
was sought to be sustained upon the theory that the quartz was "either
lost or abandoned property" and that in either event the finder was
entitled to possession as against all but the true owner.
After pointing out that the quartz had been neither "lost" nor
"al;>andoned" and that the case, therefore, should not be left to a jury
on any such theory, the court declared that the case fell within the
principle of such cases as South Staffordshire Waterworks v. Sharman.13 The principle of that case, taken from the well-known essay
on possession by Pollock and Wright,14 is that possession of land carries
with it the possession of things in and on the land. 15 The lessor thus
having been in possession of the land on which the quartz was buried
was also in possession of the quartz before the tenant-finder acquired
possession; hence the former showed a better right than did the finder.
Both of these cases came up from the same county, the same trial
judge sitting in both. In the earlier case, the Danielson one, the court
had nonsuited the boys. In the Ferguson case the landowner, as defendant, asked that the "finder" be nonsuited. The trial judge must
have felt no little surprise, if not chagrin, when he found that he was
wrong both times!
In the Ferguson case the court stresses the fact that the quartz
must have been intentionally placed where it later was found as distinguished from an inadvertent parting with possession. Precisely the
same observations might well have been made regarding the money
in the Danielson case. Indeed, the doctrine on which the Staffordshire
Waterworks case was decided, approved and applied in the Ferguson
case, seems just as applicable to things truly "lost" on the premises of
1a [1896] 2 Q.B. 44.
14 POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, POSSESSION 1N THE CoMMON I.Aw

41 (1888).
quotation from Pollock and Wright is: "The possession of land carries with it
in general, by our law, possession of everything which is attached to or under that land, and, in
the absence of a better title elsewhere, the right to possess it also. And it makes no difference
that the possessor is not aware of the thing's existence." That the words "attached to or
under" are not to be taken literally is shown by the added observations of Lord Russell in the
Staffordshire case that " ••• the general principle seems to me to be that where a person has
possession of house or land, with a manifest intention to exercise control over it and the things
which may be upon or in it, then, if something is found on that land, whether by an employee
of the owner or by a stranger, the presumption is that the possession of that thing is in the
owner of the locus in quo." [1896] 2 Q.B. 44 at 47 (Italics added.)
15 The
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that claimant as to things intentionally placed there and then forgotten.
At any rate, it seems clear that if the principle on which the Ferguson
case was rested was properly applicable there, it was equally applicable
to the facts of the Danielson case.16
The earlier Oregon case of Sovern v. Y oran17 was cited in both
cases. In that case hidden money concealed in defendant's barn was
found by X. Defendant had disposed of the money by following the
provisions of the statute regarding finding of lost things. The plaintiff,
who seems to have established ownership of the money, sued in trover.
While the court said that the money had not been "lost" in the sense
that term was used in the statute, and therefore the defendant should
not have acted under it, the only thing decided was that such disposition was not under the circumstances a conversion. The court noticed
the language found in the report of Armory v. Delamirie18 that the
finder has "such a property as will enable him to keep" the found article
as against all but the rightful owner. 19 Since the money in question
had been intentionally placed where it was later discovered by X, the
court seemed to think the doctrine of the Armory case inapplicable. 20
It goes on to observe that it may well be that "the defendant, being
the owner of the property in which the money was deposited, was
entitled to the possession as against the finders, and their delivery to
him did not make him a bailee for them," etc. This viewpoint foreshadowed the conclusion in the Ferguson case but was ignored in the
Danielson case.
Seven years after the Danielson and Ferguson cases were decided,
the Oregon court had to consider Roberson v. Ellis. 21 The defendant
therein, in possession of a warehouse, employed the plaintiff to remove
certain goods therefrom. In the process plaintiff "found" some gold
coins, which he turned over to the defendant. No owner-claimant
16 Of course, questions may be raised as to the weight of the Staffordshire case in view
of the recent case of Hannah v. Peel, [1945] K.B. 509. Students of the problem have been
disappointed that this case was never presented to the Court of Appeal.
1116 Ore. 269, 20 P. 100, 8 Am. St. Rep. 293 (1888).
181 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
19 Too often there has been a failure to note that this language taken from the report of
the case is at most a dictum. The correct statement would seem to be that the finder as possessor has a right to the possession of the thing found as against all persons except those who
can show a better right. Starting with the language of the report, attention is directed to the
narrow inquiry whether the person competing with the finder was really the owner or his
representative.
20 That is, the money was not "lost."
21 58 Ore. 219, 114 P. 100, 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 979 (1911).
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having shown up, the action was brought based upon the defendant's
refusal to return the money to the plaintiff. The decision was for the
plaintiff, the court rejecting the contentions of the defendant that he
was entitled to the money (1) as employer and (2) as possessor of the
warehouse. The Ferguson case was said to be distinguishable in that
it did not involve "treasure trove." 22 The Danielson case was deemed
applicable because, at least in part, the money in the current case had
been placed in the warehouse long enough before its discovery to fall
within the Danielson decision. 23
This, then, was the status of the Oregon case law when the court
came to the consideration of the very recent case of Jackson v. Steinberg.
It was an action by a chambermaid in defendant's hotel to recover
eight hundred dollars "found" by the plaintiff, while performing the
usual maid service in a hotel room, concealed underneath a paper
lining of a dresser drawer. The case was twice considered by the
Supreme Court. On the initial hearing the ruling was in favor of
the defendant on the ground that the maid in the act of :6.~ding and
turning over to defendant was acting in her capacity of employee.24
On rehearing the same conclusion was reached, but, interestingly, on
the ground on which Ferguson v. Ray was decided, namely, the prior
possession of the land occupant, as stated by Pollock and Wright and
then applied by the English court in the Staffordshire Waterworks
case. The court obviously was troubled by the Danielson decision as
affirmed by the Roberson case, saying that the latter case fails to discuss
at all "the effect of possession of the premises by someone other than
the :6.nder" and "undertakes to distinguish Ferguson v. Ray on the
mere ground that it was not a treasure trove case." The court added:
"It is not necessary to a decision of the present case that we should
attempt to reconcile the doctrine of Danielson v. Roberts and Roberson
22 This observation is surprising, not because it was erroneous, but because the Oregon
court had theretofore clearly taken the position that the law of treasure trove, as it existed in
England, had no operation in Oregon; money was to be treated like any other article. See
Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Ore. 108, 74 P. 913 (1904).
23 This, too, was amazing so far as it was intended
a reason for applying the Danielson decision rather than that in Ferguson v. Ray.
24 Considering the nature of a hotel chambermaid's duties, this would seem to have
been a perfectly satisfactory basis for the decision. If the employee who found the money had
been, for instance, the hotel carpenter or plumber, the employer-employee basis would not
support such conclusion. On this point see Erickson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.
(2d) 172 (1947).

as

1950]

COMMENTS

357

v. Ellis, supra, with that of Ferguson v. Ray."25 A possible explanation
for the decision in the Danielson case, also the Roberson conclusion,
is the influence mentioned at the beginning of this note, of that intuitive sympathy for a finder. Noticing, as one must, the strange sequence
of decisions in a single jurisdiction, it is easily understood why students,
teachers, and lawyers hestitate to prophesy what a court will decide in
a finder case.
Ralph W. Aigler*
25 Nothing in the report of the Danielson case indicates that the Staffordshire Waterworks case was brought to the court's attention. It is interesing to speculate as to what the
Oregon court would have done in the Danielson case if it had known of the English decision.
Its full acceptance of the doctrine of that decision when considering the Ferguson case warrants more than a little doubt as to the Danielson conclusion.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.

